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INTRODUCTION

Freedom of the press is a cherished right in a free society. The
right to publish and to speak without "any previous restraints"' is a
birthright of all Americans and is a major underpinning of the United
States Constitution. Thomas Jefferson, recognizing the importance of
a free press, stated "were it left to me to decide whether we should
have government without newspapers or newspapers without government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.... ,,2
The authority of the courts to enforce laws is another fundamental
principle at the foundation of a free society. s The American govern-

* Doctoral Student, College of Journalism and Communication, University of Florida.
1. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 151. Blackstone, whose Commentarieson the laws
of England were widely read in the colonies, is often credited with originating the doctrine of
prior restraints. "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but
this consists of laying no previous restraints upon publication, and not in freedom from censure
for criminal matter when published.
Id. See also L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE
PRESS 12 (1985).

2. Thomas Jefferson, "Letter to Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787," THE PAPERS OF
48-49 (Julian P. Boyd, XI. ed. 1955). See also L. LEVY, JEFFERSON
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 11 (1963). Levy argues that although Jefferson was against prior restraints on the press, he was not beyond punishing troublesome editors.
3. 18 U.S.C.A. § 401 (1966) provides that:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment,
at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as (1) Misbehavior
of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration
THOMAS JEFFERSON
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ment's protection of individual rights is based upon laws, not men. 4
To enforce laws, courts must command respect and be unencumbered
by challenges to their authority that defy the judicial process. 5 The
Supreme Court has stated that respect for the judicial process "isa
'6
small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law."
The free press and judicial authority collide, however, when a court
orders a communication medium not to print or broadcast information
in the medium's possession. 7 The potential conflict between judicial
authority and the free-press clause of the first amendment poses an
important legal question: Whether a publisher, faced with what it
believes to be a patently unconstitutional prior restraint in the form
of a court order, s may violate that order and later challenge its constitutionality if held in contempt by the court?
II.

JUDCIAL AUTHORITY/]PRIOR RESTRAINT ISSUE UNRESOLVED

A.

CollateralBar Rule

Until the 1988 United States v. Providence Journal case, the highest legal authority on the matter of publishers violating what they

of justice; (2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; (3)
Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
Id. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 42.
4. United States v. United Mine Works, 330 U.S. 258 at 307, 309 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
5. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 510 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
979 (1973). In Dickinson, Judge Brown distinguished between violation of statutes and court
orders. He noted that disobedience of judicial orders requires further action by the judicial
system, which directly affects a court's ability to discharge its duties. Without contempt authority, courts are "mere boards of arbitration whose judgments and decrees would be only advisory."
Id. at 510; see generally Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS WITH EQUITY (1950), R. GOLDFARB,
THE CONTEMPT POWER (1963) and 0. Fiss & D. RANDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS (2d ed. 1984).
6. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321 (1967) (holding the invalidity of a court
order is no defense in criminal contempt cases); see also United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 258 (1947); Howat v. State of Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922); Gompers v. Buck's Stove
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). In Gompers the Court stated:
If a party can make himself a judge of the validity of orders which have been
issued, and by his own act of disobedience set them aside, then the courts are
impotent, and what the Constitution now fittingly calls "the judicial power of the
United States" would be mere mockery.
Id.at 450.
7. See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
8. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. The definition of a transparently invalid prior
restraint is problematic and will be dealt with in detail later in the paper.
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considered patently unconstitutional judicial orders was United States
v. Dickinson.9 Under the Dickinson rule,10 publishers or broadcasters
who disobeyed judicial orders, even orders believed to be unconstitutional, knew they could be summarily held in contempt of court. In
Dickinson, the Fifth Circuit rejected the appeals of two reporters
who had disobeyed a judge's order not to publish information from an
open court hearing.' The two reporters had attended a federal district
court hearing involving two VISTA workers charged with conspiracy
to kill the mayor of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 12 The district court judge,
interpreting the court's Free Press-Fair Trial Rules,13 ordered the
media not to report testimony from the open hearing.' 4 The reporters,
15
however, published stories based on the hearing the following day.
The court held both reporters in contempt and fined each $300.00.16
The Fifth Circuit found that the district court judge's application
of the Free Press-Fair Trial Rules was "bottomed irrevocably on a
mistake of law" and therefore was unconstitutional.' 7 However, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court's order, while premised
on an "erroneous view," was not "transparently invalid.' 8 The Fifth
Circuit upheld the contempt order, affirming the collateral bar rule.
The collateral bar rule states that court orders, regardless of their
constitutionality, must be obeyed until set aside for the judicial system
to function.19 In his opinion, Chief Judge John R. Brown acknowledged
that news can lose its value even after a short delay. 20 However, the
judge stated that the proper action would have been to appeal and
obey it unless the order was "disrobed of authority by delay or frustration in the appellate process regardless of the ultimate determination
'2
of constitutionality, or lack thereof." '
Dickinson appears to be the only case to apply the reasoning of
Walker v. Birmingham- to a pure speech case where speech was not

9.
10.

(1988).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 496.
See K. MIDDLETON & B. CHAMBERLIN, THE
Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 496.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 500.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 509, 514.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 512.
Id.
388 U.S. 307 (1967).

LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 420
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combined with a public activity, such as a protest march, in a way
that prevents a publisher cited for contempt from attacking the constitutionality of the original order. In Walker, the Supreme Court
affirmed the collateral bar rule in a case involving the Reverend Martin
Luther King Jr.? The Reverend King and other civil rights demonstrators defied a court order and held a protest march in Birmingham, Alabama. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Walker,
ruled that although the injunction against the planned march was
unconstitutional, it should have been obeyed.2
The Court emphasized two distinguishing characteristics in its holding. First, the Court had consistently recognized the strong interests
of state and local governments in regulating the use of their streets
and public places. 25 Therefore, the Court reasoned, this was "not a
case where the injunction was transparently invalid or had only a
frivolous pretense of validity."26 Second, the Court observed that it
had "emphatically rejected the notion" that the first amendment
afforded the same freedom to communicate ideas by actions, such as
marching and picketing on streets and highways, as it affords those
who "communicate their ideas by pure speech. '27 In other words, the
injunction in Walker was an arguably valid attempt to regulate the
use of public streets and not an attempt to suppress pure speech.
Justice Stewart reasoned "no man can be judge in his own case, however exalted his station, however righteous his motives, and irrespec''2
tive of his race, color, politics, or religion. 8
B.

Cases Contrary to the Dickinson Rule

Courts in several states held contrary to Dickinson when publishers
have defied court orders not to publish. The Washington Supreme
29
Court in State ex. rel. Superior Court of Snohomish Co. v. Sperry
reversed contempt citations of two reporters whose stories were published based on information from an open court proceeding 0 The
court, allowing a collateral attack on a contempt ruling, held that the
reporters could safely ignore a court order that was patently uncon-

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 307.
Id. at 320-21.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 315-16.
Id. (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1967)).
Id. at 320-21.
79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608 (Wash.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
Id. at 78, 483 P.2d at 613.
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stitutional.31 The court distinguished the case from Walker noting that
the court order in Walker, which banned a civil32 rights march, though
unconstitutional, was not transparently invalid.
In State v. Coe, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the
collateral bar rule. The court held that a lower court order prohibiting
a Spokane station from broadcasting taped recordings was patently
invalid.3 The recordings were played in open court in a case involving
solicitation for murder. The Washington Supreme Court, relying on
the state constitution,3 5 held that the trial court's prior restraint on
information from open court was invalid and could not support a contempt charge.3 6 The court, citing Sperry,3 7 noted the collateral bar
rule of Walker was inapplicable because Walker dealt with a court
order that was not transparently invalid. Instead the court order in
Coe was patently invalid.3
In Wood v. Goodson,3 9 the Arkansas Supreme Court followed the
Washington Supreme Court's decisions. In Wood, a newspaper editor
disobeyed a circuit court judge's order not to publish the results of a
jury verdict. 40 In invalidating the court order, the Arkansas Supreme
Court noted that "no court . . .has the power to prohibit the news
media from publishing that which transpires in open court. 41 The
court noted that a subsequent contempt charge against the editor
could be challenged collaterally.42
Similarly, the Appellate Court of Illinois allowed a collateral attack
in Cooper v. Rockford Newspapers, Inc.- In Cooper, a newspaper
was cited for contempt when it violated a court order not to publish
editorials about a libel suit filed against the newspaper.- The appellate
court reversed the contempt finding and the court held that in balancing the competing interests of the free press and the integrity of the

31. Id. at 74, 483 P.2d at 611.
32. Id.
33. 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (Wash. 1984).
34. Id. at 374, 679 P.2d at 359.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 374, 679 P.2d at 358 (citing State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 72 Wash.
2d 69, 483 P.2d 608, 611 (Wash. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971)).
38. Coe, 679 P.2d at 358.
39. 253 Ark. 196, 485 S.W.2d. 213 (Ark. 1972).
40. Id. at 197, 485 S.W.2d at 214.
41. Id. at 203, 485 S.W.2d at 217.
42. Id.
App. 2 Dist. 1977).
43. 50 Il1. App. 3d 250, 365 N.E.2d 746 (Ill.
44. Id. at 251, 365 N.E.2d at 747.
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courts, the defendant should not be held responsible for violating the
court order. 45 The court distinguished the case from Walker, noting
that the order in Walker banned a civil rights march, not pure speech.46
Furthermore, the mere fact that the newspaper did not attempt to
appeal the injunction before defying it did not preclude the newspaper
47
from challenging the validity of the order, according to the court.
The California Supreme Court also rejected the collateral bar rule
in a free speech case decided the year after Walker. In In re Berry,4
the court held that a temporary restraining order against a county
employees' union was unconstitutionally overbroad and improperly restricted employees' first amendment rights.4 9 The county argued that
the collateral bar rule expressed in Walker precluded the employees
from raising a constitutional challenge because they had disobeyed the
order without first attempting to have it vacated. 5° The court noted
that the Walker ruling held that violation of frivolous or transparently
invalid orders might be permissible.' The court concluded that Walker
was consistent with the California rule that an order that is invalid
cannot support a contempt judgment. 52
In Mayer v. Florida,3 the Second District Court of Appeal did not
invoke the collateral bar rule and allowed constitutional arguments on
appeal of a contempt conviction of a reporter whose newspaper published information from a closed child custody hearing.54 In Mayer,
the reporter was allowed to attend the hearing after agreeing not to
report anything without the judge's permission. 55 The court weighed
arguments concerning the constitutionality of the order restricting
reports on the closed hearing, but upheld the contempt charge.- The
court, however, based its decision on state case law and statutes
57
related to custody hearings.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 255, 365 N.E.2d at 750.
Id. at 257, 365 N.E.2d at 751.
Id. at 254-55, 365 N.E.2d at 749-750.
68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. 1968).
Id. at 150, 436 P.2d at 286, 65 Cal. Rptr. 286.
Id. at 146, 436 P.2d at 282, 65 Cal. Rptr. 282.
Id.
Id.
523 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1988).
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1173-76.
Id.
Id. at 1174-75.
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C.

The Providence Journal Case

While courts in several states have not followed the Dickinson
rule,1s it was not until the Providence Journal defied* a temporary
restraining order against publishing legally obtained information that
a case rivaling Dickinson reached the United States Court of Appeals.
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Providence Journal Co.5 9 refused to address this dilemma of balancing the
needs of courts to maintain their authority with the first amendment
rights of publishers to publish without prior restraints. In Providence
Journal, a newspaper defied a judge's temporary restraining order
that the newspaper delay publication of information legally obtained
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.6The Providence Journal case began on November 8, 1985, when
Raymond J. Patriarca filed suit against the FBI, the Justice Department, the United States Attorney General, a television station and
the Providence Journal.6 ' The suit sought to prohibit publication of
logs and memoranda relating to information about Patriarca's father,
the late Raymond L.S. Patriarca, a reputed mobster.6 The logs and
memoranda were based on information gathered by the FBI using
illegal wiretaps. The illegal wiretap information itself had previously
been destroyed.The Providence Journal was served with a temporary restraining
order on November 12, 1985, prohibiting it from publishing the information obtained from the FBI.6 On the following day, attorneys for
the involved parties met with the chief judge for the United States
District Court of Rhode Island. The judge then entered a temporary
restraining order barring publication and set a hearing on the order
for the following day, November 14.65 Since the Journal's attorney
asked for more time to prepare, the judge reset the hearing for
November 15.
On the night of November 13, 1985, a Journal official briefed Editor
Charles M. Hauser on the restraining order.67 The official explained
58. Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 510.
59. 820 F.2d at 1342 (1st Cir. 1986), modified 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987) (enbanc), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 693 (1988).
60. Id. at 1345.
61. Id. at 1344.

62. Id.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1345.
Id.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 696.
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the consequences of publishing in defiance of the order and advised
that there were no practical means of appealing the order that night.r
Hauser, aware that some of the information released by the FBI had
already been made public elsewhere, decided to publish two articles. 69
One article contained information obtained from the FBI. 70 The other
71
article detailed the Journal's conflict with the court.
Patriarca's lawyer filed a motion that the Journal be held in contempt of court. Since the United States Attorney's Office in Rhode
Island represented the federal defendants in related civil actions, the
district judge invoked a federal regulation allowing appointment of a
special prosecutor to pursue the contempt motion. 72 After a hearing
on February 10, 1986, the district court found the Journal and its
executive editor in criminal contempt. 73 At a sentencing hearing on
April 2, 1986, the Journal was fined $100,000. 74 The executive editor
received a suspended sentence with the requirement that he perform
two hundred hours of community service and was also placed on pro75
bation for eighteen months.
The Journal appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Judicial Circuit, which reversed the judgment.76 Judge John
Minor Wisdom, Chief Judge for the Fifth Circuit, admitted that the
appeal posed a question with no easy answer. 77 Judge Wisdom stated
that in reaching its opinion, the court endeavored "to avoid deciding
which principle should take precedence by reaching a result consistent
with both principles."T7 The First Circuit found that the district court's
order was transparently invalid.7 9As a result, the Providence Journal
could challenge the order's constitutionality collaterally in the contempt
proceedings.-o The court found that none of the grounds asserted by
the special prosecutor provided even a colorable basis for the temporary restraining order. 81

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
for an

Id.
Id.
Id. at 696.
Id.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
Patriarca,630 F. Supp. at 1345.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 697.
820 F.2d at 1342, 485 U.S. at 697.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1353.
Id.
Id. at 1349-50. The special prosecutor asserted three grounds supporting the request
injunction. The court rejected each claim: The Freedom of Information Act (finding the
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The First Circuit, sitting en bane, reheard the case at the request
of the special prosecutor.8 2 The court upheld the opinion, but modified
it to minimize the disharmony between respect for court orders and
respect for free speech.8 The court, recognizing that it was speaking
"technically in dicta"4 by modifying the opinion without altering the
holding, added the requirement that a publisher make a good faith
effort to secure appellate relief.- If timely access to an appellate court
were not available or if a timely decision not forthcoming, a publisher
may violate an order and challenge its constitutionality at a later
86
contempt hearing.
The special prosecutor petitioned for writ of certiorari on behalf
of the federal district court judge whose contempt order was overturned on appeal.8 7 The Journal argued that since the temporary restraining order was "transparently invalid" and unconstitutional, the
newspaper was entitled to defend itself on those grounds in contempt
proceedings."' The Journal also filed a motion seeking dismissal of
certiorari, arguing, among other things, that the special prosecutor
was not lawfully empowered to petition the Supreme Court. 89 The
special prosecutor asserted that the district judge was justified in
issuing a temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo while
considering the apparent conflict between first amendment and fourth
amendment rights.On May 2, 1988, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari. 91 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated the courtappointed special prosecutor had acted without the authorization of
the solicitor general.- Therefore, the special prosecutor did not prop-

disclosure fell within the F.B.I.'s discretion and holding an injunction for federal agency disclosure
was outside the court's authority); Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (providing an action for damages
to individuals injured as a result of illegal disclosure of private communications but not providing
for injunctive relief); U.S. Constitution fourth amendment (finding fourth amendment protection
of citizens limited to abuses by the government, not' private parties and holding fourth amendment
does not apply to the newspaper and editor as private parties). Id.
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
despite
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Matter of Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d at 1354.

Id. at 1355.
Id.
Id.
Id. (stating that asking the publisher to attempt to attain emergency appellate relief
the apparant unconstitutionality of the order is not too great a burden).
United States v. Providence Journal Co., 484 U.S. 814 (1987).
Providence Journal,485 U.S. at 693 (citing brief for the respondents at 20).
Id. at 697 (citing brief for the respondents at 7 n.7).
Id. at 695-6 (citing brief for the petitioner at 7).
Id. at 694, 697.
Id. at 694.
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erly represent the United States before the court.9 3 The opinion emphasized that the Court had granted certiorari because of the importance of the issues raised in the First Circuit's Providence Journal
ruling.- The Court, however, left unresolved an apparent conflict between the First and Fifth Judicial Circuits regarding publishers' rights
to violate what they believe to be patently invalid judicial orders and
to challenge the constitutionality of the orders at subsequent contempt
hearings. 5
D.

Comparison of Dickinson and Providence Journal

While the First Circuit in Providence reached a different conclusion
from the Fifth Circuit in Dickinson,- regarding publishers' rights to
violate what they believe to be patently invalid orders, the legal
reasoning underlying the cases, as articulated in Walker v. Birmingham,97 seems consistent. The Walker Court affirmed the collateral bar
rule that a party who violates a judicial order gives up the right to
challenge the constitutionality of the order.ss However, the Walker
Court also envisioned an exception should a judicial order be deemed
"transparently invalid."' In Walker, the Court held that the court
order was unconstitutional, but that the City of Birmingham had a
legitimate interest in maintaining order on its streets. 1°° The Court
also distinguished between pure speech and speech combined with
actions, such as a protest march that might disrupt traffic.101 The
order, while unconstitutional, was not "transparently invalid" because
it was not directed at pure speech and because the city had legitimate
interests in regulating traffic. 0 2
The Fifth Circuit in Dickinson reasoned that the fair-trial concerns
expressed by the district judge were legitimate, but that the judge's
order was misguided and constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint.1o3 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the judge's concerns could

93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 698.
Compare Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972) with Matter of Providence Journal
Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986), modified, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987).
96. See Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
97. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
98. Id. at 307.
99. Id. at 315.
100. Id. at 315-16.
101. Id. at 316 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1964); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1940)).
102. Walker, 388 U.S. at 316.
103. Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 512.

JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

have been resolved by applying less restrictive measures on the
media.- 4 Nonetheless, absent a showing that the order was transparently invalid, the contempt order could stand. 1 5 In Providence, the
First Circuit followed similar reasoning, but concluded that the underlying order was transparently invalid, and that such an order could
not form the basis for criminal contempt.Both Dickinson and Providence alluded to the reasoning of Justice
Stewart in Walker that the "case would arise in a different constitutional posture" had the petitioners challenged the order and met with
delays and frustration in the courts.10 7 The Fifth Circuit, in affirming
the collateral bar rule in Dickinson, noted that the proper action would
have been to appeal and obey the order unless confronted with "strong
' 8
indications that the appellate process was being deliberately stalled."10
In Providence, the First Circuit's en banc ruling stated that a publisher
faced with a transparently invalid court order may proceed to publish,
but only after making a good-faith effort to seek emergency appellate
relief. lO9
The Providence and Dickinson cases differ, however, on the circumstances of the violations and the subsequent penalties. In Dickinson, a decision was made to publish information from an open hearing
that was already in the public domain. The Fifth Circuit was in a
relatively easy position to allow contempt penalties to stand, based
on an unconstitutional prior restraint found to be not transparently
invalid. The penalties, a $300 fine for each of the reporters, amounted
to a judicial slap on the hand. 10°
In Providence, the stakes for the media were much higher. The
information, although legally obtained from the FBI, was not yet fully
in the public domain. The newspaper, in publishing the information,
not only violated the restraining order during a time when its lawyer
had sought and been granted more time to prepare, but it also chose
to publicize its disobedience in a news story that outlined its conflict
with the court. The $100,000 fine, eighteen-month suspended sentence
and requirement for community service reflected the apparent indig-

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 512-13.
Id. at 514.
Matter of Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1353.
Walker, 388 U.S. at 318.
Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 512.
Matter of Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1355.
Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 513 n.19.
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nation of the court.- Given the severity of these penalties, the First
Circuit was not in an easy position to chastise but affirm the lower
court, which it found to be clearly in error.
III. A PUBLISHER'S OPTIONS
Where do these apparently conflicting opinions leave the publisher
who has just been served with a restraining order prohibiting publication of information slated for the next day's editions? In the First
Circuit's jurisdiction, a publisher faced with what it believes to be a
transparently invalid order may publish after first seeking timely appellate relief. Likewise, a publisher in the Fifth Circuit may publish
in violation of a transparently invalid prior restraint. However, the
Fifth Circuit substantially narrowed the meaning of transparently invalid. If a prior restraint on an open court statement is not transparently invalid, given the Supreme Court's near-absolute prohibition
against such orders,112 it is difficult to imagine what might be.
In both the First and Fifth Circuits, a publisher must unravel the
meaning of "transparently invalid.113 Similarly, in several states, mentioned previously, a publisher who defies a court order may be allowed
to raise a constitutional challenge if held in contempt.1 4 However, the
majority of the nation's publishers must act knowing that they likely
would be held in contempt. The publishers' fates ultimately will depend
on how a particular court, faced with the confusing precedents of two
similar cases with opposite outcomes, chooses to balance the conflict
between the principle of judicial authority and the near-absolute prohibition against prior restraints.
IV. QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED
What questions might the Supreme Court have resolved had it
reached the thorny issue of judicial authority versus freedom of the
press as presented in Providence Journal?
Publishers are concerned that they must obey unconstitutional judicial orders based on the reasoning of Walker and earlier cases. Such
decisions are more powerful than a statute. A statute may be violated

111.

Matter of Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1345.

112.
113.

Dickinson, 465 U.S. at 496.
Transparently invalid is a term legal scholar Lawrence Tribe has described as "a

chimera, what does it mean?" "It's Ok for Press to Defy Courts, But . . . " National Law

Journal4 (Jan. 26, 1987). See id. See also Matter of Providence Journal, 485 U.S. 693 (1988).
114. See Cooper v. Rockford, 50 Ill. App. 2d 250, 365 N.E.2d 746 (Ill. App. 2d 1977); Mayer
v. Florida, 523 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1988).
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and constitutionally challenged. 115 In fact, Judge Brown pointed out
in Dickinson that in some situations intentional disobedience is the
only way a statute can be tested.116 The imbalance between the judicial
and legislative branches in this context poses an interesting constitutional question. A comparison of Walker and a related case, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,117 is instructive. The court order in
Walker paraphrased a Birmingham ordinance that the Supreme Court
a year later in Shuttlesworth held to be an unconstitutional restraint
on first amendment speech. 18 In effect, the Alabama courts could
prevent the civil rights marchers from exercising their first amendment rights while denying the marchers who exercised those rights
effective judicial relief."19 One commentator, writing in the wake of
Walker v. Birmingham, suggests that courts' refusals to hear collateral
attacks in such cases create the appearance of "judicial lawlessness"
instead of promoting public respect for the legal system.'2
The Supreme Court could have articulated a procedure for courts
to follow when faced with requests for restraining orders on pure
speech. Compare Chief Justice Burger's approach to balancing free
press concerns with the sixth amendment rights of a defendant to a
21 In that
fair trial in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.1
case,
Chief Justice Burger virtually eliminated the possibility of a constitutional prior restraint on what transpired in open court. - The Supreme
Court has found the same heavy prohibition against prior restraints
in non-courtroom situations.'- As Justice Brennan noted in New York

115. Dickinson, 465 U.S. at 510. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1986).
The Supreme Court held that the municipal ordinance, on which the injunction in Walker v.
Birmingham was based, was unconstitutional. Id.
116. Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 510.
117. 394 U.S. 147 (1986).
118. Id.
119. Id. See V. Blasi, PriorRestraintson Demonstrations,68 MICH. L. REV. 1482 (1970).
120. Note, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HARV. L. REV. 626, 635 (1970).
121. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Supreme Court set forth the following test to balance the
first amendment Rights of the Press with the fair-trial rights of a defendant: First, the trial
court's determination of the probable extent of publicity must be more than speculative; second,
the trial court must have considered other less press-restrictive alternatives to protect the
defendant's rights; last, the trial court must consider whether any press restrictions imposed
will achieve their goals. Id. at 562-67.
122. Id. at 559-62.
123. See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see also New York Times Co.
v. Unites States 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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Times Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court has never upheld a
prior restraint on publication of news.- u
The Court also could have established a test similar to the licensing
procedures in Freedman v. Maryland.'- Such a test shifts the burden
to the government when seeking a prior restraint, and requires a
court ruling in a short period of time.126 Providenceprovides a possible
starting point where a publisher faced with a transparently invalid
judicial order first seeks timely appellate relief and publishes only if
met with delay. For example, the Supreme Court could require, in
the case of a prior restraint on news slated for publication, that a
court issue a ruling on any request to delay publication before the
deadline for publication or forgo the collateral bar rule.
Short of a procedure that would ensure that first amendment
speech is not lost while waiting for a judicial hearing, a workable
definition of what constitutes a transparently invalid order would be
essential. None of the foregoing cases provide a clear definition of the
term. Walker seems to suggest that an order proscribing pure speech,
as opposed to speech combined with action such as a protest march,
might be transparently invalid.12 7 Judge Brown, in Dickinson, offers
some guidance, noting that "it is obvious that if the order requires
an irrevocable and permanent surrender of a constitutional right, it
cannot be enforced by the contempt power."12 Such a definition would
seem to cover loss of the right to publish information slated for immediate publication, but Judge Brown discounts this argument in Dickinson.1
The First Circuit, citing Nebraska Press, suggested that three
criteria must be met before prior restraint orders could be found
invalid.130 A party seeking a prior restraint must show that publication
would result in loss of a near-sacred right, that the prior restraint
131
will be effective, and that no less restrictive means are available.
124. 403 U.S. 713, 724-27 (1971).
125. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
126. Id. The Supreme Court established a test to protect first amendment rights in filmlicensing schemes. First, the party issuing the prior restraint has the burden of justifying it;
second, action has to be taken by the issuing party in a short, specified, amount of time; finally,
a court must render final decision in a short period time. Id. at 58-9.
127. Walker, 388 U.S. at 315-16.
128. Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 512. See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (recognizing
that the loss of first amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury).
129. Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 511-12.
130. Matter of Providence Journal,820 F.2d at 1351 (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 562-68 (1976)).
131. Matter of Providence Journal, 820 U.S. at 1351.

JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Some state courts have suggested that
error of law exceeds the jurisdiction
transparently invalid. 132 Despite these
"transparently invalid" generally seems
realm of "I know it when I see it."1

any judicial order based on an
of the court and is therefore
possible definitions, the term
to have slipped into the judicial

V. CONCLUSIONS

Procedures for challenging prior restraint orders have several flaws
when applied to news media. In the news business, the value of what
is printed or broadcast often depends on how quickly it is made public.
Any procedure that interferes with the publisher's ability to decide
when and what to publish has the potential to destroy the news value
of information. As Judge Brown noted in Dickinson, "Timeliness of
publication is the hallmark of news and the difference between news
and history is merely a matter of hours."14 Court-imposed delays,
even for only hours, could diminish or destroy the news value of
information. Subjects of critical news accounts could seek a court hearing for spurious reasons, which the court might ultimately reject. In
the meantime, the news value of information might be diminished or
destroyed even if a publisher prevailed in court. The subject of a news
account, under these circumstances, could delay critical information
long enough to release a favorable account through another receptive
outlet. Such a process could allow well financed special interest groups
to impede or frustrate the legitimate news process of the media. Delays, as Justice Brennan pointed out in his concurring opinion in Nebraska Press,1s5 often extend far beyond a matter of hours. Justice
Brennan noted that gag orders, which were ultimately struck down,
were in effect for an average of eleven weeks.136
The creation of procedures for challenging court-imposed prior restraints also overlooks the small publisher or pamphleteer, both of
whom might lack the will, legal sophistication or financial resources
to mount a creditable legal fight. In such instances, a legitimate first
amendment right would be denied without an opportunity of redress.
The tension between the need for judicial authority and the strong
presumption against prior restraints will likely reach the Supreme
Court again because of the apparent conflict between rulings of the

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

In re Berry, 436 P.2d at 288-89.
Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 512.
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 572-614.
Id. at 609 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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First and Fifth Judicial Circuits. 137 The Court has already acknowledged
"the importance of the issues" in its opinion in Providence dismissing
certiorari.1- Meanwhile, most publishers must live with the judicial
ambiguity of the collateral bar rule. Publishers can either violate a
judicial order and risk almost certain conviction for contempt and lose
the right to challenge the order's constitutionality, or obey the order
and lose, at least for a time, the first amendment right to publish
timely information. As Justice Kennedy stated: "A broadcaster or
publisher should not . . . be required to make a sudden appearance
in court and then take urgent measures to secure appellate relief, all
the while weighing the delicate question of whether or not refusal to
comply with an apparently invalid court order constitutes a con39
tempt."1

137. Compare Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972) with Matter of Providence Journal,
820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986), modified 820 F.2d 1354 (lst Cir. 1987).
138. Providence Journal, 485 U.S. at 698.
139. Goldblum v. National Broadcasting Corp., 584 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir. Cal. 1976). See
also Barnett, The Puzzle of PriorRestraint, 29 STAN, L. REV. 529 (1977) (arguing that courts
should reject gag orders because they put the press in the position of having to choose between
relinquishing a constitutional right or obeying a potentially unconstitutional order); Redish, The
ProperRole of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in FirstAmendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53
(1984) (stating language in Walker should be interpreted to include first amendment precedents
that would make transparently invalid a wide range of injunctions against pure speech).

